

THE ARCHEOLOGY OF MODERN EUROPE

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The Archeology of Modern Europe

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During 1995 and 1996, Mr. Jackson was National Co-Chairman of the Dole for President Finance Committee. In 1996, he was a delegate to the Republican National Convention where he served on the Platform Committee and the Platform's subcommittee for National Security and Foreign Policy. During the 2000 Presidential Campaign, he was a delegate committed to Governor Bush and chaired the Foreign Policy Subcommittee of the Republican Platform Committee.

Mr. Jackson is the President of the US Committee on NATO, a non-profit corporation formed in 1996 to promote the expansion of NATO and the strengthening of ties between the United States and Europe. During the 2002-2003, he served as the Chairman of the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq. He continues to serve on the Board of Directors of the Project for the New American Century, a non-profit corporation involved in educating American opinion on foreign policy and national security.

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INTRODUCTION

The main discussion of the day taking part in the United States and in Brussels is called the *Vision Statement*, and it focuses basically on what are the visions of the future, since we are beginning a new period of our history.

There is a photo taken during Kosovo-Albanian conflict (*Photo 1, p. 33*). The thing that makes it special is that it depicts a child carrying a bag who says Europe. People are walking over the Cursive Mountains and they think they are going to Europe. The question of this briefing is: *Are they doing so?* Is this part of the integration process that you have your conference on?

We named the result *the frontiers of freedom*. During this program I would like to show at least one idea of what the Alliance and European community might be doing over the next four to five years. As such I want to remind you that this is just a moral preamble of what is going on in Europe, and it can be identified by looking at the archeology of Europe. This introduction is relevant because if we do not know from where Europe emerged, we won't know where it may head. The last part of the presentation/article will be reserved for debating the third phase in the European history.

The question *What is Europe and who is European?* emerged from the Prague Summit, and it was suggested by Vaclav Havel. Actually the debate begun at the December 2002 Copenhagen Summit about Turkey and it is much larger than that. But Brzezinski said, a couple of day's later in Vilnius that this is formally the beginning of the third and final phase of the post 1989 history.

For purposes of coherence we have divided this problem into three baskets:

1. The problem of the Balkans;
2. The problem of the Black Sea security system, and
3. The problem of the border lines.

These large baskets represent places where Europe has not defined herself. The final question is whether or not we are entitled to talk about the completion of Europe. One of the first points in this briefing is that we really cannot pretend we are just adapting the NATO Alliance framework. The completion of Europe is not merely the adaptation of an antiquated 1949 alliance. It is potentially the greatest change in world politics since the Peace of Westphalia (*Photo 2, p. 33*).

There is another picture taken three hours from the World Trade Center bombing in the middle of the night, in Tirana, Albania (*Photo 3, p. 34*). Its role is just to remind people about some connections. People gathered as a spontaneous react, and the manifestation was not directed by the government or by other organizations. And Tirana was definitely not the only place in the world where signs of solidarity with the American people were displaced spontaneous.

So, it does appear that there is some kind of community: when something happens on one side of the world, there is an emotional react in the opposite part of the world, even in the middle of the night. So, it does suggest that when Bush is talking about a community of shared values that some kind of community really exists. The reason why I am showing this to you is because of a moral exercise. This concept on what is the European-Atlantic community is, basically, a question of moral philosophy: *What are the shared values that define a community?* Please, take note that this is a question of moral philosophy, not military theory.

What we have been arguing about, most of the period of 2003 and through the UN Security Council 1441, comes down to this matter:

What is the justified use of power? That was basically the difficulty in Iraq or Kosovo. Along with this question lays another one: *What is the responsibility and what is its magnitude?* Are we responsible for Rwanda, Afghanistan, or Bosnia? How far do we have to go in order to be responsible? But the question here is another one (*Photo 4, p. 34*).

This is the first time since 1949 when the international community is required to analyze these basic principles once again. My guess is that these inquiries will continue to make the agenda for the next five years, as a part of a moral investigation. When Bush explained what happened in 1989 he did not talk about NATO, or about the membership plan; he did not even mentioned the military aspects. He just quoted the Pope John Paul the IInd, and said that 1989 was caused by a new vision of man and its possibilities (*Photo 5, p. 35*).

What we have to understand is that 1989 was not a moral or a political revolution, but a moral revolution in politics (*Photo 6, p. 35*). And that is way people like Vaclav Havel or the Pope John Paul the IInd are speaking especially about a moral discourse.

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THE ARCHEOLOGY OF MODERN EUROPE

We start with a picture of classic Europe with the main empires which acted here: Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Tsarist Empire, and Turkey trying to tear apart the Balkans. This basically shows where we begun from. Obviously, since 1849 we have been reordering these regions in the attempt of creating a more stable Europe. One of the things we have been talking to Americans is that we care deeply not to alienate Turkey once again. This would be a major step back for this part of Europe, for the Black Sea, the Adriatic states, and obviously, for Romania, as well.

We can see how things evolved: this is the first extension, followed by the events in 1952, 1954 in West Germany, 1982 in Spain, and then the Visegrad moment, along with the Big-Bang enlargement (*Photo 7–12, p. 36–38*), which translates practically into the predicted seven countries that will join NATO, as the Prague Summit suggested.

Basically this graphic (*Photo 13, p. 39*) shows you that Europe is not complete. What I would like to do is to discuss about this disturbed phase of history.

This slide (*Photo 14, p. 39*) represents the important moments in the last twenty years of history, beginning with 1989 and going until 2010. Throughout this phase we have been talking about membership: first, it was the German unification, then was Visegrad, Vilnius, and now we are talking about Adriatic area or Ukraine. In other words, for twenty years now, we've been asking who the member of our community is. We've also debated on what is the mission of our community,

beginning with strategic documentation (in 1991 and 1997), and then, in practice, with Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.

But, like in a normal marriage relationship, you have to argue about money all the way through. So, we've been arguing with the Europeans on who pays what, namely who pays for the capabilities and who doesn't. We've got very far on this debate and now we have to end it. The burden sharing discussion, which is known as the ESDP debate, is related to what EU and NATO are doing. Along with this particular matter, there is also the membership debate, which refers to the concept of completed Europe. The new challenge is to resolve the problem of the Greater Middle East. As a matter of speech, you begin by asking who you are, but you find out the answer to that question only twenty years later.

One of the biggest concerns is that we believe that there is not much time left. We call it the Romanian revolutionary time when the Romanian window of opportunity opened. This is distinctively an American point of view. If you are talking to Mr. Romano Prodi or Mr. Solana, they are historical determinists: they think history is going to do everything for them and that the next fifty years are going to carry us to victory. Americans do not believe that. They believe that individual actions in the near term are what matters. What I would like to emphasize is that, according to our strategic plan, we are running out of time. We have to make decisions today, we have to start reforming today, and basically we have to move forward. Romano Prodi and certainly Chris Patton might not say that. The challenge for this period is to find out what is the best action for Romania during this revolution. Our argument on that is that Europe will be complete by the end of this decade.

If Romania is not a member of the EU by the end of the decade, there is going to be a problem. Don't get me wrong, I'm just making policy recommendations. This is the idea of the third phase, which gets interesting if you look at the numbers: after the German unification, 18 million people came into the Alliance. In the Visegrad framework were added Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, so there were 60 mil-

lion additional people during an extended period of time. By comparison, in the recent Vilnius round entered seven countries, but only 43 million people (*Photo 15, page 40*).

If you actually go out and ask people if they are inside or outside Europe, we'll find out that there are 117 million people, living in fourteen countries, who think that they should have a closer relationship with Europe. The Turks, Ukraine, Western Balkans, the Caucasus, Moldova, there is an important number of countries who think they should be included. And this is really the question of the third phase.

But also these phases were different. Let's look at Poland: it was a democracy, it was a nation state, and it was a part of Europe for centuries. All you have to do is plug them in NATO. Unfortunately, it was a lot more difficult to plug them in the EU. Vilnius round represented more than a simple one-step process. Mečiar was still in charge in Slovakia and we had some problems with the democratic process in Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Romania, which led us to the conclusion that we are talking about a two-step program: first democratization, then integration.

If you are looking at the third round though, we've got some real challenges here. There are some countries, like Macedonia, who don't know their names, Georgia, who doesn't know what her borders are, so they are not yet mature nation states. Almost none of them are democracies, and a large number of their leaders are not democrats. This entitles us to say that we have a lot of democracy issues. It is going to be a huge question whether or not they are European. Is Azerbaijan European, for example? Vaclav Havel would say yes, but a lot of people would probably disagree.

In the nineteenth century, countries like Germany or Italy became nation states, and this represented, in fact, the lesson of the nineteenth century in Europe: becoming a nation. The lesson of the twentieth century is to eliminate totalitarianism, and become a democracy and first time such challenge occurred was after the World War Two. The challenge of the twenty-first century is to integrate in the political and market institutions of Europe. Basically, all we are asking these countries

to do is to accomplish in three years what their western neighbors did in three hundred. It was never done before: to have nationalism, democratization, integration, and post-conflict confrontation, more or less at the same time. To get Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Serbia, Abkhazia, along this process proves to be very challenging

Let's take a look on where is the Alliance today (*Photo 16, p. 40*).

This is a map we've put together right after Prague to show the American senators that we haven't finished Europe: there is no Adriatic security system, there is no such thing as an agreed Black Sea security system, or we have not won the peace in the Balkans. Plus, we're reaching a limit of our institutions' ability to integrate, so we are now talking about engaging, because we can't integrate Russia or Ukraine today. At the time, there was no Mediterranean dialog what so ever. Dr. Robert Asmus is now trying to start one, but it didn't exist when we wrote the chart. So there is a lot left to do in Europe.

One of the most interesting things is that the Alliance no longer faces towards Moscow. We can see it is already pointing South and East, across the Mediterranean Sea, to the Greater Middle East, so it is already changing its function. It does much more on stability and democratic operations, much more engaging in operations trade and equipped.

If we are looking at the great three projects (keep in mind that this is a vision statement, not a recommendation policy) the agenda contains the Balkans, the larger Black Sea system, and the classic problem of border lines: what do we do with Europe's neighbors (*Photo 17-19, p. 41-42*)? The point is that we are not only building something, we are also destroying something. The experience since 1878 (*Photo 20, p. 42*) shows they got the lesson of nationalism deeply wrong. What do we do about it (*Photo 21, p. 43*)?

One of the things we've been telling to countries, which Romania and Bulgaria understood, is that we have to be in a region before we enter Europe. One of the classic problems of Balkans was that it was never a region in Europe. There is not such thing as South Eastern Europe in European history (*Photo 22, p. 43*). In fact, the title of this

map shows where wars begun from, as recently as 1877. The first thing we have to do is to reject the previous models of security. This is what President Bush said in his Warsaw speech: no more Molotov-Ribentropp Pacts, no more Yaltas, and no more Munichs.

Well, we have some bad models in the South, as well. The first model is Bosnia, which happened in 1908, concretized by its occupation. The second model is partition in the south, which moved populations around on ethnical criteria. That is what the two Balkans wars meant. The point is that if we are going to reject models like Molotov-Ribentropp Pact, than we should reject these models too. They failed for the last hundred years and all they achieved was to reinforce the prejudice of Western Europe towards Balkans, and basically set the stage for a new conflict.

We have to consider new ways to relate. Only eight years after US-NATO troops crossed the Sava River in December 1995, every country in the region is in some phase of reintegration in the European institutions (*Photo 23, p. 44*). Moreover, if you are looking at this “kindergarten” of democracy, you can see that it was created after the decision in Prague to include Romania, Bulgaria, and previously Hungary in NATO. Now, there is an Adriatic charter system, there are EU transition forces in Macedonia, or international protectorates settled in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Belgrade (*Photo 24, p. 44*).

Those are very good news because it means that every single Atlantic institution is engaging in this area. Frankly, this “kindergarten” for democracy is not only teaching the Balkans, it is also teaching NATO and EU on how to pursue complementary objectives, especially because they have parallel paths. Usually, the more institutions are entering a region, the further and faster that region is advancing. If you can go in the Caucasus, and you are a NATO mission equipped, you cannot find an EU branch. Going further, they are also building things of their own: the case of Croatia, orthodox Macedonia, and Islamic Albania (*Photo 25, p. 45*). They have all signed the Adriatic charter in the United States, just a few months ago. This is actually the first time

when three different confessions, ethnicities, and nations join a NATO security system.

So, in a weird way, they are not catching up with Europe, they are in front of Europe. If Turkey is joining EU, in twenty years all of EU's countries will have the same character: multi-confessions, multi-ethnicity, multi-nationality. So, they are actually teaching us something; new models are occurring in this region.

If you put it all together, we will have a very interesting map: these countries are NATO allies and members of the Adriatic charter, they are petitioning for admission in the Partnership for Peace program, Moldova wants to move over into the Stability Pact, the Adriatic charter countries are thinking about including Bosnia and Serbia into their framework, and these three countries are well positioned in the course for EU membership (*Photo 26, p. 45*).

That is a very good story. And frankly this is how the Baltic Northern zone looked like in 1998. This region is probably less than five years behind from where Finland, Scandinavia, and the Baltic region are. This is the most advanced democratic evolution in this part of the world, which makes it part of a very good news. Obviously, what we think is to build together those two triangles and basically take the center of the Balkans. You have to take Belgrade, in order to have the Balkans, historically speaking. Or you can't do it, and we will have more Arkans like this. I think that Dindici assassination shows us how easily we can lose the young generation of children in western Balkans (*Photo 27, p. 46*).

Looking at the second system (*Photo 28, p. 46*), there is the emerging Black Sea security system. The question is *can the Black Sea develop like a second Mediterranean system?* One of the things we've been discussing is that this is the map of the former Roman Empire. All we have been talking about today, energy security framework, reconstruction of Iraq, the Middle-East peace, the western Balkans, the new threats to Europe, all these represent problems located in the former Roman Empire. Nobody mentions the GI-UK gap that was a great strategic issue

for 1998, which means a line in the Atlantic Ocean. It could be said that for the last fifty years everything is in the southern flank.

Some of you have seen this chart before: this is a CIA map (*Photo 29, p. 47*) with projected gas and oil routes around the Black Sea. But this is also the route for sexual trafficking, narcotics, illegal immigration, Al-Qaeda, so that is the route for proliferation. So, whatever you think the threat is to Europe, you would want to control the security along the Black Sea. So, we are not talking about the Mediterranean or the Atlantic. The Adriatic, the Black Sea, and the Caspian Sea are the subjects when we talk about Euro-Atlantic security.

But it is not just the negative things that draw our attention. We have at least three great possibilities in the area (*Photo 30, p. 47*):

1. We are going to give Russia a meaningful role in this part of the world and perhaps energy trade might be a vehicle for having mature relationships with Europe;

2. Also, we would like to secure the energy security of Europe. Today Europe has 50% imported, by 2020 it will have 70%. That extra 20% has to come from the Caspian;

3. Those countries whose GDP went down after 1989 they were very few in the Euro-Atlantic structures, but they were all in the Black Sea: Caspian, Ukraine, and eastern Turkey. So the people that were left behind in 1989 were in this region. The reason they were left behind is because the Danube borders were closed, so they did not have any access to the economical miracle that occurred after the fall of communism.

For summing up, let me go through the three positive matters once again: the Black Sea is a pivot point in mature relationships with Russia; it also holds the energy security in Europe, and it delivers economical growth for significant part of Europe. But this is, in the mean time, the traditional route for spices and silks. So, my point is: if you can move spices and silks, can you also move democracy? If we want to export prosperity and democracy from Europe to Central Asia or South East Asia, we have to go through the Black Sea region (*Photo 31, p. 48*).

This is the most expanded phase of the Roman Empire, which translates today as the Southern most extent area from the Russian Empire. I'm including here Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Pankisi, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Each one of these frozen conflicts lies in the North of the Black Sea (*Photo 32, p. 48*). Let me make an important academic point here: Samuel Huntington was wrong! The clash of civilizations did not divide Vienna, Istanbul, Berlin, or Moscow. It is a fault line which stretches from East to West, goes through the scenes from Euro-Atlantic system and the Greater Middle East borders.

And that is where we should work on. US had some initiatives in Transnistria, and hopefully we are trying to receive some progress for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The argument is that the region closest to east of Romania holds the key of democratization for both Russia and, optimally, the Greater Middle East. This is a hugely important area next to your east borders.

The question is: *Is the Caucasus the Easternmost point in South East Europe?* How do we know if it belongs to Europe? The immediate reaction is to look for European characteristics. This is an unstable border with Russia, but what we have to worry about is that this is actually a NATO border. To be more specific, it is the only NATO border, and it's the closest in the system. If you think about it, that is also Europe's border with Iran, so all the way to this specific border, we have a European space. In other words, there are at least three European characteristics in strategic terms, not to mention the oil from Baku. The reason why the area preserves some of the 1980's characteristics and remains unstable is because of Nagorno-Karabakh. The general idea is that the Caucasus holds the key for The Third Russian Policy (*Photo 33, p. 49*).

What is the Third Russian Policy? In 1997 Strobe Talbot negotiated the Founding Act, which basically meant resolving some security issues from Czech Republic and Hungary, and opened the NATO border. The resulted region faced two actors: the West and NATO. In

2002, Bush signed the agreement, during the Russia-NATO Council in Rome. After that, appeared the Vilnius opportunity, which opened the NATO border for a lot of countries. The argument is: *how to resolve the insecurity of Russia to the west?* If you are thinking about the relationship from 2007-2008, maybe we should be talking about Russia's problems in the South, and do the same thing for the south that we did for its West. Since we've already gotten a relationship that involves NATO and Russia, maybe the next relationship will involve EU.

So, any of the two things we might do (energy trade and peace in the South) will have to include Caucasus. If you are trying to think ahead for the third relationship (2007 onwards), it has something to do with the Black Sea in the South. There is not anything more we can discuss in regards of Slovakia or Romania. Basically, if you want a schematic map of the region you can see immediately how far behind the Balkans are. We are still trying some peace processes in Pankisi Gorges, but there are no negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh; there is no regional cooperation yet; there are not any successes regarding the secessionist movements in Abkhazia or South Ossetia; there is a debated border with Turkey, and obviously we have not been talking seriously about Russian's conduct in Chechnya (*Photo 34, p. 49*).

This is pretty intimidating. We can start by having a policy, or we can not have a policy. What you've learned from Western Balkans is that if you don't stop in Mostar, or Chechnya, you end up in Srebrenica (*Photo 35, p. 50*). This is not going to stop: it will come from the Caucasus inevitably. Let me skip through the border lines issues which are the third of the baskets.

What you can see now from the slide (*Photo 36, p. 50*) is the Russian extension throughout history and the pressures put on Kiev. That is how we can explain why Ukraine has a great deal of finding a space in Europe and why it had to pursue a multi-vector policy.

We can see why, when Bush is talking about the Black Sea, although I think he mentioned Caspian Sea also, he recognizes here the beginning of European structure (*Photo 37, p. 51*). You can find more

people from Georgia going up and down Kiev or Vilnius, which proves the existence of a cultural line. So there is some European structure and we have the historical data to prove so.

The third tendency I wanted to point out is the traditionally European order requirements from this region, starting from 1920, along with the threats imposed by the Bolsheviks. The EU framework uses the concept of May 2003, when they used the terms *preemptive engagement*, and they refer to Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova as requiring this kind of agreement. The EU is right; they are going to be forced to engage because they can't put a bogus border there. It won't work. They must have a more comprehensive strategy towards this region, and for hundreds of years they have been forced to do that. Recognizing the Euro-Atlantic system is important because you can't engage in relationships without this acknowledgement (*Photo 38, p. 51*).

Just to summarize what is going on:

1. Moldova wants to move over and to anchor herself in the security system developed by Romania or others in South-Eastern Europe;
2. We have to understand Kiev is the key not only for Russian relationships but also for the Caucasus area. Obviously to separate Europe and Moscow it's very dangerous at this time (*Photo 39, p. 52*).

We have above (*Photo 40–41, p. 52–53*) a schematic presentation of the decisions that are on their way and the schedule of what other institutions are doing. This is the NATO schedule: it went to Prague; it will go to Istanbul next June for making a decision on new members by 2006. EU is doing the same thing: the intergovernmental conference will be held in Copenhagen, and Romania and Bulgaria are expected to join in 2007. The Adriatic countries to your west are getting ready for the NATO summit and for the NATO decision, which forces them to work on a security problem.

1. The Inter-Balkans are trying to get on the train and they are worried about being left behind. They are desperate over the PfP, because the active membership gives them the chance to emerge with

the Adriatic group. Otherwise, will have two classes of citizens: ins and outs.

2. Turkey doesn't have to care about a security problem; they have instead a problem with the EU and they are focusing only on this campaign for the EU date.

3. Ukraine just wants to find a starting line and they hope on an intensified dialogue, but this is not possible earlier than Istanbul.

The point I need to emphasize is that Europe is going to be closed for repairs in between 2004-2006. You are not going to see external changes. You may see constitutional change, voting rights change, but you won't see membership without foreign policy regulations. Europe opens for business again in between 2006-2008, so everybody is planning on a 36 months arising. The big changes are scheduled for this period: the re-election of the US president, or the completion of the constitutional changes. Basically, the window is politically opened for this three years and it begins to close again as you go to the end of the decade. That is why we think that this decade is the key.

Just to anticipate this point I had some debates in Brussels and somebody told me that I can't prove that the door is going to close. My answer is that they can't prove it will stay open, either. So, if we can prove it will stay open, enter now, especially because we both agree it's open now.

Looking forward, we have several victims of discrimination:

1. Victims of the EU discrimination: Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey; they are basically focused on an EU campaign, which is the second battle of Copenhagen;

2. There are victims of war: Yugoslavian secession is just an example. Everything they are doing is security related and when we are trying to solve basic security threats everyone turns to NATO, because EU is too far away from that;

3. Also, there are the victims of European forgiveness, such as Georgia, and resembling countries. They are trying to find a starting point, but frankly if they don't resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh prob-

lem, they can't go further. When you have issues that need to be settled like Abkhazia or Nagorno-Karabakh something must be done;

4. Finally, there are the victims of themselves: Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus did it to themselves. Perhaps, everything goes down on how well Ukraine is doing, and its destiny is dictated by the elections. But if you don't have a stable Ukraine it's a myth to talk about solidity.

The whole argument here is the argument of velocity. You can't do democratic change slowly. It is like an airplane taking off: if an airplane takes off slowly it won't even reach the end of the runway before it crashes. You have all the list attributes of democratic change and aerodynamic lift by going rapidly. Lots of these countries are simply moving too slowly to get critical escape philosophy.

Let's try to sum up this completion of Europe concept (*Photo 42, p. 53*). This is how the core EU Europe looks like today [blue] (*Photo 43, p. 54*).

I've included in this map not only the member countries, but also the ones who have some integration options, as well (*Photo 44, p. 54*). Every country out there has the option to enter in any of the international organizations. These countries represent Greater Europe, and they are unrequited. They seek closer relationships that are not currently given. We would argue that this is the great debate. Obviously, we think it is morally preferable to have a Greater Europe for understandable reasons, but it is also preferred using strategically criteria. A Greater Europe will give better chances for this third relationship with Russia, because you have finally moved all ambiguity from Russia's borders and basically Europe and Russia can touch each other all the way around (*Photo 45, p. 55*). And also if you were serious about doing the Greater Middle East, as I think US is, this Greater Europe gives you a far better chance for the long term effort to democratize the Greater Middle East. If you just want to talk with the Greater Middle East from Vienna, this is not going to work. In this larger vision we can talk all the way from Morocco to Iran.

So basically the argument is that Greater Europe prepares the stage for two most endeavors of the twenty first century democracy:

1. The full reconciliation of Europe with Russia;
2. The democratization and neutralization of the Greater Middle East (*Photo 46, p. 55*).

This is of course a part from a big project which is going to last about 50-70 years. If you are serious about this, you can be very conscious about the actions on three capitals: Ankara, Belgrade, and Kiev (*Photo 47, p. 56*). These are basically the turning points in the three baskets. Without them European community is going to be smaller, narrower, and ultimately, less secure. This is the reason why people are so keen on this project. This probably tells you why the Istanbul Summit is in Turkey: it was done deliberated in order to recognize its political and strategically importance. Another thing that I want to point out is that all the three countries, Romania is one of them, are highly capable for reaching their goals.

I want to refer now to the economic sustainability of democracy. The rule is that if you go over 6,000 GDP per capita, your chances of failing democracy is 1:500 (*Photo 48, p. 56*). There are only nine countries like that in the world, at this moment. One is in Asia, Malaysia; the other eight countries are in this periphery part of Europe. So, the argument here is: if you want to make democratic changes, you don't want to throw the ball all along in Afghanistan or Rwanda, because chances there are low. If you actually want high chances of democratic success, begin move the center of your democracy in this part and bring peace and prosperity out that way.

Another thing we must discuss is how the exporter of democracy can become also exporter of prosperity and how these Black Sea states can enroll democracy. Since you are engaged into a parallel process of integration in the EU structures, I do not want to talk only about NATO. According to Romano Prodi and the official policy there are three future members and the interesting thing is that Croatia did not receive the final approval. Turkey, curiously enough, has. What they

have done is to add their neighborhood policy at these countries: seventeen more, plus Gaza and West Bank, plus Russia actually, but they left out Caucasus (*Photo 49, p. 57*).

There are two competing visions about Europe's future: a smaller core of Europe (*Photo 50, p. 57*), or a larger, more comprehensive, in a growing, developing Europe (*Photo 51, p. 58*). The decisions coming out over the next 48 months are going to be important, since they are influencing 1,708 million people for generations to come. We have to be honest with ourselves: historically speaking, these countries are the most unstable: the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Ukraine. The reason we wish to do this is because there is a great potential outside in a Russian affiliation. There are huge opportunities to develop partnerships with EU, and also to work with Russia.

One of the things I feel strongly about is that without a Greater Europe we cannot hope for a Greater Middle East. If we are not ready to complete the Euro-Atlantic community we can take our minds from democratizing the Greater Middle East. Coming back to Romania, my argument is that the path you are going on now, is also your path for the next fifty years (*Photo 52, p. 58*). These are the frontiers of freedom and these are the areas on which we should be concentrating for the next four to five years.

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Open session for questions:

Question one: My name is Ana-Maria Gheorghiu, I am a student at the NATO Study Center, and this is my question. Now we have seen how important the Black Sea is, from the NATO's point of view. What about the military base at Mihail Kogălniceanu? At what point is the discussion for this base? And, finally, when will this base be established?

Answer: First of all, I am not a government official. My understanding about this project is that they were considering three major

submissions: Polish, Bulgarian, and Romanian. Obviously, I wouldn't expect Donald Rumsfeld to really get around with these three positions for the next three months. The Department of Defense is involved in a real war in our basis. We are not considering long term strategic plan. There is no secret that I am strongly recommending the Romanian position, but I'm not expecting the plan of that base earlier than November, next year.

You must also acknowledge that these bases do not resemble to the ones in the World War Two. Back then, the settlement of an American base in one region was like winning the lottery: where we've put a base, the money start flowing around. I do not think this will be also the case. They will be closer to these Lilliputian concepts. Hopefully, they will develop a training capacity, just to prove a substantial effect. The new framework will have to be a little more resembling with the modern NATO line. But this is just my best guess.

Question two: My question is about GUUAM organization, which is formed by Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. We also recognize that this is a part of a very brave American project, which today seems to be retired. We know that Uzbekistan has already withdrawn from the organization and we know Moldova is not so fit to keep it active. My question is if GUUAM still exists in the new framework of the enlargement of the Atlantic space. Shortly, is it still a live project?

Answer: I think you are asking the question in the exact way. GUUAM has big problems. Conceptually, it is a little hard to understand, and it is probably the dumbest name that somebody can come up with. Somebody at the Center thought that it is an island in the Pacific. It always had that problem: it started like a very brave idea, but doesn't seem to have gotten very far.

I was just recognizing how difficult the problem of GUUAM is when I wanted to write this presentation for the Black Sea security. The problem with the Black Sea is that it has either one system, either too many systems. But with the Alliance, we basically agreed that the

Euro-Atlantic is one system. Also the World War Two was one system, as well. It is either too much, or it is too little. If we look back we can discover that GUUAM was just a transnational phase. As the Black Sea defined itself, GUUAM was just a mere expression of this, and surely does not represent the final destination.

There were also some Black Sea economic zones established there. Minsk Group process is pretty much a Black Sea process, and that is why I don't understand why the Black Sea countries are not a part of the Minsk Group. There are a lot of confused organizations and GUUAM is not the only one. If you look at the security problems, Abkhazia is managed by the UN, but South Ossetia is managed by OSCE. The question is why. This is just an accident; the worse part is that they don't talk to each other. So there are a lot of anomalies around here.

As the countries are moving towards NATO and EU, I think there will be a consolidation of things like GUUAM and force it to become an efficient organization. Right now, GUUAM does not deliver according to its declared objective

Question three: As I see your ideas, this vision is basically focusing on the Greater Middle East, but going back from this big strategic project, how would you comment the reaction from this country report regarding the countries you've placed under the umbrella of the "discriminating group"? Are we assisting to the revival of the idea of different steps of integration? I'm talking here about Bulgaria's and Romania's accession. There are different discourses, particularly from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bulgaria, talking about the idea that Bulgaria shouldn't wait for Romania for the integration.

Answer: Maybe you should tell me. I think I see what you mean. I have to be diplomatic about this: the chances of Bulgaria having to wait for Romania may easily be dismissed as negative. I had the opportunity to talk seriously with Mr. Prodi about these issues three weeks ago and he stated that the date for both Romania and Bulgaria is 2007. I'm not playing around with variable in geometry, this is a fact. And

I'm not interested for Croatia to join the class – that will happen in 2009. This is one of the first points of discussion. I think that is a fair evaluation of where the countries are. I applaud Bulgaria for civic boosterism and it is always the tendency to inflate one's credentials once you are in a competition. That is probably a healthy sign of self-regardness, but it is not an objective process. I think Prodi is correct when he puts both countries roughly on the same level. You will see, once you go deeper into statistics that for Romania this process is pretty impressive

Question four: It seems to me that security challenges in the NATO view had changed dramatically. More and more people are associating these security challenges with the annihilation of international trans-boundaries terrorism. These challenges had split the Alliance in the last years. Of course, there is the problem of Iraq. It appears that we are facing a boost both at the philosophical level and the policy one. US, and to a certain extent, UK also, have a discourse about preemptive military intervention, or to circulate the international organizations where they don't perform. However, there are people saying that these institutions had taken a lot of time and effort to develop and we should hold on to them. What is your comment on that?

This is also visible in the selection of different methods. United States, a very legalistic country in its characteristics, proves a skeptical view for the international law which made US a sitting duck. For instance, the ratifying of international conventions with the global countries which US is virtually demonizing. On the other hand, all European countries have some problems with US: see the issues with the ICC, for example. But this is visible even in the Security Council deliberations regarding Israel. My question is, since your presentation focused on Eastern Europe's expansion, do you think that this challenge is underestimated or it might trigger the whole Alliance obsolete apart from the territory which is covered by its member's states, as a global institution?

Answer: A lot of premises in that question. Let's tide it up a little bit. The presentation wasn't about extension, but it was about what the European community meaning in the future and what possible reasons United States might have in the alliance with European countries. Basically I tried to give an answer to the question: *what is the possible future, for the next fifty years, concerning Euro-Atlantic marriage?*

Secondly, I actually did intelligence assessments for quite a long period of time. If you think the threats uniquely changed in your lifetime, in some preventive sense, I would say that probably this is not correct. There won't be any Russians coming through this; I talked to Ukrainians about their national right today. We are much focused when it comes to this so called new threats; they are not actually that new. The security framework does not change that rapidly. Regarding whether the Alliance will split or not, again that is a hard case to make. There were seventy countries in Iraq, and an immediate conclusion about the national split, would say that the Germans did not want to go for an alley game, which was true for the last sixty years, and the French are not really in the military alliance, which is true for the last forty years. So, we've always known Germans and French won't do this kind of interventions; this is the nature of the complex. But to call this a split it would mean overstating the case.

What are you really asking, it seems to me, is if there are two attitudes about the functions of the institutions. One, in the United States, defines limited actions, because we are not talking about super-national institutions to give us orders and seek legitimacy for them. They can judge this if they can help us in Srebrenica, it is ok, if not, we are interested in working with them. Then there is the other attitude, the French one, who functions on a Kantian philosophy: we derive our values from the institutions. Therefore we should follow them, even though they fail in the practical term, as long as it functions on a theoretical form, this is great.

We should have huge investments of political prestige in them, but this would mean certainly to abuse. Through the International Court

we want to enable peace keeping, we want soldiers to volunteer for peace keeping, so they won't be exposed to double jeopardy, capriciously induced on their willingness to support civilian operations. I think this is a wonderful debate to be happening; to ask these questions for the principle value. I think these debates will go on for the next twenty to twenty-five years. If you look at the history of the Alliance, we have been discussing it from 1933, and you didn't have something relevant until 1960.

So, you will find that formations of the Alliances will be asking those questions for the next 20-25 years. In other words, we are not really seeing a divorce in the Alliance; you are seeing adolescence, when they go through basic relationships and how they feel about each other, what they value and what they don't value. Obviously, the fact that world politics is dominated by what we feel about our environment, that it's called winning. That is basically what we tried to do for the last seventy years. We are not having the discussion about the nuclear missile, the confrontation in Taiwan, or the Suez issue since yesterday.

This is actually a great thing: the fact that this generation can focus on these important relationships. And I think we did not end up here being compromise. Don't give up yet. It's going to work up.

Question five: My question is as follows: is NATO ready to give the floor of reform from its hand to EU?

Answer: This is a very technical question. The sure answer is that I don't know. Very often the EU volunteers for missions because of the political capital, but without having the technical abilities or the result to back it up. I think the Department of Defense said we are going to move a little slower on this hand over so we are sure that this is a critical mission and the parties themselves are less happy about this juncture, especially because they lack confidence of the result. My guess is that it will take longer.

Question six: If I understood correctly you've offered us a more political view on how security in Europe would look like. What will be the financial and economical support for such a big extension?

Answer: The Alliance costs nothing; that is the whole point. These political projects have, comparatively speaking, no cost. I think you are discussing about the EU integration, and, in that case, you're talking about serious money, both for stating some chances, or for the infrastructure. In this case, aspirant countries will have to pay. Also, we are talking about serious downstream effects of the consequences being in the European market. Referring to the Caucasus states we are not in a European neighborhood, so we are talking about exclusion from four European freedoms which mean free flow of: visa, capital, labor, and investment. They were not excited because they were thrown out. They've lost probably fifty billion dollars, namely the difference in between twenty-five years being in, versus being out. So the net effects of the immigration are probably huge and usually accelerate economic development. As far as the big bills, they are coming especially from the peace keeping processes.

The integration of Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania, in the EU, that is not going to break anybody's back. War time expenses and peace keeping expenses are far higher than integration operating cost. It would depend on how much you have to do to these countries in terms of reconstruction, rehabilitation, as a part of this project. I frankly don't know that.

Question seven: My name is Ioana Matej and I am a former NATO Studies Center's student. We were talking about exporting democracy from Europe to Central Asia, in order to counter the cascade effect of asymmetrical threats. What do you think are the most important categories in order to transform failed states or failing states onto the path of democracy?

Answer: Specifically, with Central Asia, my great concern is that we went there and established bases mainly because we had a global security threat in Afghanistan, and subsequently in Iraq. But, for long time commitment, Euro-Atlantic institutions, whether European or American, need basic conditions of democracy. So if we want to stay there in a meaningful way, we have to work on the democratic

changes. At the end of the day, Nazirbayev alone is not going to be satisfactory. Obviously, the first points on which we have to work in Azerbaijan and Georgia are about the free election problem.

All three elections in the last year, in the Caucasus, had gone badly. The last one in Georgia doesn't appear to be completed at all. Several states just refused to vote, or they stopped their voting ballots. Elections are a basic organization of government. After that, we must include free press, because big part of arresting journalists focuses on independent media in today's Moscow. Then you strengthen NGO's, and their proliferation. There are thousands of books on democratic transition, and none of them is reliable. We have to ask ourselves what was successful in Lithuania or in Poland. There are a lot of lessons, but it is hard to generalize. You can't really take the Macedonian example and move it in Armenia. We must take into consideration historical and political situation of the country. But, beyond that we don't have a general theory yet.

Question eight: My name is Stanislav Secieru, and I am from Moldova. I am attending courses at the National School of Political Studies and Public Administration and I am interested in the evolution of post-soviet Russia. What are your comments on the Russian's strategic counteroffensive in putting the Eurasia block for collective security treat, and recently opening a base in Kyrgyzstan? Also, what do you think about the strategy to recreate Eurasian economic block signing the treaty of common economic Eurasian space which include Ukraine, Belarusia, and Kazakhstan?

Answer: I don't know if you've been reading my post articles, but we are highly negative about the Russia's conduct, in terms of internal policy, human rights development and its actions for reinforcing the policy of near-border. I don't mean only the economic space or the security measures, but also, in the press conference in October, the 9th, where Putin formally said two things:

1. That Russia had the right to resort on the preemptive use of military force and to intervene military anywhere in the CIS, where negotiations were not an answer;

2. Second, Putin clarified that any place where there is an oil or a gas pile, that region belongs to Russia. That is a part of their national security and they reserve the right to intervene and to maintain them.

This is an immense, stunning measure in its illegality and claim in the international system. It should be quickly rejected and I think US, through the voice of Senator McQueen, discarded this claim of extraterritoriality of the Russian Empire. It is not only the economic claims, nor military basing; it is also interference in elections from Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine. In the case of your country there is the coercive settlement of the problem with the Moldovan territoriality integrity, which retains Russian troops on your territory. There has been a pattern of nineteenth's century actions that Russia has been conducting for the last ten to twelve months, which is really disturbing. We are expecting serious debates on Putin's decision to return to repression at home and aggression abroad. So, I agree with the premises of your question – it is really very disturbing.

Frontiers of Freedom



Photo 1

Agenda

- The Moral Preamble
- The Archeology of Modern Europe
- The Third Phase of European History
- The Project of Balkan Peace
- The Black Sea: The "Second Mediterranean" System
- The Borderland of Values
- The Completion of Europe

Photo 2 – The completion of Europe is not merely the adaptation of an antiquated 1949 alliance. It is potentially the greatest change in world politics since the Peace of Westphalia



Photo 3

The Moral Preamble

- What is the Euro-Atlantic community of democracies?
- What are the shared values that are the core of the new Euro-Atlantic community?
- What is just in the use of power in defense of these values?
- What is responsibility in the actions of states in this period in history?

Photo 4 – A new Atlantic generation is struggling with first principles. These generational questions will be answered in the third and final phase of modern European history

"The revolutions of 1989, were made possible by the commitment of brave men and women inspired by a different, and ultimately more profound and powerful, vision: **the vision of man** as a creature of intelligence and free will immersed in a mystery which transcends his own being and endowed with the ability to reflect and the ability to choose – and thus capable of wisdom and virtue."

– Pope John Paul II



Photo 5 – 1989 was not a military or political revolution. It was a moral revolution

The Archeology of Modern Europe



Photo 6 – The West has been reordering the fragments of Empire since 1949. The greatest threat of the completion of Europe is the relegation of Turkey to its 19th Century role as the "Sick Man of Europe"

The Evolution of NATO



Photo 7

The Evolution of NATO



Photo 8

The Evolution of NATO



Photo 9

The Evolution of NATO



Photo 10

The Evolution of NATO




Photo 11

The "Big Bang"



Photo 12



Photo 13 – The succes of Prague and Copenhagen at the end of 2002 set the stage for the completion of Europe




Photo 14 – Europe begins a transformation in 1989. A challenge is how best to use what remains of this revolutionary period. A new Europe will be largely complete by the end of this decade

Third Phase of European History




Photo 15 – Over the next three years, almost one third of Europe’s peoples will attempt the transformation that took their Western neighbors almost three hundred years



Photo 16 – Europe will increasingly focus on building democracy, ensuring stability and engaging countries on Europe’s borders. Europe now looks across the Mediterranean and Black Sea towards the Greater Middle East



Photo 17



Photo 18

The Borderlands



Photo 19



Photo 20 – For over 100 years, Balkan political models have failed to provide security or stability. These models oppressed the Balkan people, reinforced the prejudices of Western Europe, and sowed the seeds of future conflict

The Project of Permanent Balkan Peace

(And the Destruction of 19th Century Nationalism)



Photo 21

The Seat of War in Europe (1877)



Photo 22 – There is no historical concept of SE Europe. The Balkans were solely the source of war and instability



Photo 23 – In December 1995, US forces crossed the Sava River. In less than eight years, every country in SE Europe has begun to reintegrate in European institutions



Photo 24 – The “kindergarten for democracy” in the Western Balkans also served as a vehicle for NATO and the European Union to learn to pursue complementary objectives

The Adriatic Charter




Photo 25 – The Adriatic Charter prefigures a new Europe of great ethnic and religious diversity in a conjoint system of political pluralism and tolerance



Photo 26 – The Western Balkans are now developing their own regional security sistem. Moving Serbia and Montenegro into NATO's Membership Action Plan is the next step



Photo 27 – The tragedy of Prime Minister Djindic's assassination brought us to the moral abyss. We had nearly lost the Balkan children. The return of Belgrade to Europe will define the future of SE Europe




Photo 28 – By 2003, Euro-Atlantic security interests had shifted to the Southern flank and into Turkey's area of operations



Photo 29 – The redefinition of the threats to Europe redirected NATO towards stability in the Adriatic, Aegean, and Black Seas



Photo 30 – The Black Sea is also the pivot point for a more mature relationship with Russia, for the energy security of Europe, and for economic growth in the regions of Europe which were left behind in 1989

The New "Silk Road"



Photo 31 – Traditionally, the Black Sea is the door between Europe and Asia. Integrating the Black Sea states in Europe will ultimately support development and democracy in Central Asia and SW Asia



Photo 32 – The interface between the Euro-Atlantic and the Greater Middle East runs across the Black Sea. This region holds the key to the democratization of both Russia and the Middle East



Photo 33 – Not only does the South Caucasus hold the key to Europe's 3rd Russian policy, but it is also the beginning of Greater Europe's engagement with the Greater Middle East

A Blueprint for the South Caucasus

- Win the peace in the Pankisi Gorge
- Re-open Key West discussions of Nagorno-Karabakh
- Expand regional cooperation (MAP)
- Open discussions on Abkhazia and South Ossetia
- Open Turkish/Armenian border
- Engage Russia




Photo 34 – The borderlands link Europe's North and South and provide a bridge between Russia and Western Europe



Photo 35 – Is Grozny the necessary consequence of the tectonic collision of European and Asian powers? Or is it the abdication of responsibility and the desecration of human values?



Photo 36 – While Western Europe regarded these states as borderlands, Ukraine first responded to these centrifugal forces with a “multi-vector” foreign policy. The same forces that influenced Western European history shaped Europe’s East



Photo 37 – Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova have been an essential part of European history. The borderlands link Europe's North and South and provide a bridge between Russia and Western Europe



Photo 38 – All European powers have seen Eastern Europe as key to European security. Strategic circumstances will force both EU and NATO to pre-emptively engage Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova



The Borderlands

Photo 39 – Although the pace of internal reform in Ukraine is discouraging, Kiev is the key to the inclusion of Russia in the Euro-Atlantic community. The 2004 NATO Summit will be determinative for Ukraine. A “Good Neighbor” policy alone is inadequate to the purposes of both Europe and Russia




Photo 40

The World Cup Schedule




Photo 41 – The acceleration of societal change is the defining characteristic of post-1989 Europe. The velocity of democratic reform will determine the success or failure of the third phase of European history



Photo 42

The Completion of Europe



Photo 43

The Completion of Europe



Photo 44

The Completion of Europe



Photo 45

The Completion of Europe



Photo 46 – A greater Europe sets the stage for the two great endeavors of 21st century democracy: The full integration of democratic Russia in the Euro-Atlantic community and the democratization and liberalization of the Greater Middle East

The Completion of Europe



Photo 47 – Ankara, Belgrade and Kiev will define the completion of Europe. Without them, the Euro-Atlantic community will be smaller, narrower, less generous, less prosperous and ultimately less secure

The Completion of Europe



Photo 48 – Eight of the nine states most likely to succeed as liberal democracies lie along the frontiers of freedom. These states are key to bringing increased trade of long-term prosperity to Russia and Ukraine



Photo 49 – Europe's neighborhood includes all the nations on the Southern shore of the Mediterranean (except Libya) and the West Bank and Gaza. Surprisingly, Russia is part of the neighborhood and eligible for the Four Freedoms associated with "Wilder Europe", but the democracies of the South Caucasus are not



Photo 50

The European View of Europe's Future



Core EU Europe
(25 plus 3)

Current and Future
EU States

Photo 51

Conclusions

- There are two competing visions of the future of Europe: a core Europe and a completed Europe.
- Decisions in the next 48 months will affect 170 million people and the Euro-Atlantic community for generations.
- The third phase of European history will contend with the most unstable regions of Europe: the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Black Sea, and the Ukrainian borderlands.
- Permanent peace in the Balkans, Caucasus and borderlands will open Europe's doors to Russia and set the stage for Russia's partnership with the US and the European Union.
- Without a Greater Europe, we cannot hope for a democratic Greater Middle East.

Photo 52